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Abstract 
On July 20, 2006, in New York City, Resources for the Future convened a workshop of 
stakeholders and state officials engaged in the Regional Greenhouse Gas Initiative (RGGI) together with 
experts on various aspects of using auctions. The workshop provided technical assistance to states for the 
development of a plan to satisfy the requirement for an allocation of emissions allowances to benefit 
consumers or for strategic energy purposes. The workshop included an overview of auction theory, a 
panel on concerns of stakeholders about using an allowance auction in the RGGI, a panel on the 
motivations for and lessons from using auctions in other applications, and one on past experiences with 
auctions of emissions allowances. This workshop summary presents the main ideas presented by speakers 
and the audience. The summary concludes by drawing on the discussion to compile a suggested roadmap 
identifying steps for planners in moving toward implementation of the auction.  
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Summary of the Workshop to Support Implementing the Minimum 
25 Percent Public Benefit Allocation in the Regional Greenhouse 
Gas Initiative 
 Dallas Burtraw and Karen Palmer∗
Introduction and Background 
In December 2005, the governors of seven northeastern states signed a Memorandum of 
Understanding (MOU) outlining an agreement to implement the Regional Greenhouse Gas 
Initiative (RGGI). The MOU was the product of a two-year effort by nine Northeast states to 
develop an emissions trading system for the power sector that will change the landscape of 
climate policy in North America and begin to build a U.S. carbon market that can value and 
promote emissions reductions. The seven participating states that signed the MOU are 
Connecticut, Delaware, Maine, New Hampshire, New Jersey, New York, and Vermont. The two 
states that participated in discussions but have not signed the MOU are Massachusetts and Rhode 
Island. A draft model rule was released for comment in March 2006 and, after consideration of 
formal written comments from more than 100 parties, a final model rule was issued in August 
2006. In April 2006, legislation was signed by the governor of Maryland to bring that state into 
the program. The District of Columbia, Massachusetts, Pennsylvania, and Rhode Island continue 
to serve as observers in the process. The result of these activities is to provide for the first time in 
North America both a mandatory emissions limit and a price on greenhouse gas emissions. The 
state of California recently has enacted a law requiring the California Air Resources Board to 
take similar steps in that state.  
The RGGI MOU agreement will stabilize carbon dioxide emissions for the power sector 
in the region beginning in 2009 and going through 2014, which will lead to a 10 percent 
reduction from current levels by 2019. A key feature in the design of the program as set forth in 
the MOU is the guidance for the initial distribution of emissions allowances. Each state retains 
the ability to distribute allowances initially, but all states agree that at least 25 percent of their 
allowances will be allocated for consumer benefit or strategic energy purposes.  
                                                 
∗ Dallas Burtraw and Karen Palmer are senior fellows at Resources for the Future. This workshop was supported by 
grants from the Kendell Foundation, the Energy Foundation, and the Hewlett Foundation. 
1 Resources for the Future  Burtraw and Palmer 
On July 20, 2006, Resources for the Future convened a workshop of stakeholders and 
state officials engaged in the RGGI together with experts on various aspects of using auctions. 
The workshop provided technical assistance to states for the development of a plan to satisfy the 
requirement for an allocation of emissions allowances to benefit consumers or for strategic 
energy purposes. The workshop helped to synthesize lessons from auction theory with lessons 
from real-world experience with different types of auctions, including past auctions of emissions 
allowances. It also invited various stakeholders to articulate their main concerns about the 
potential design and operation of an auction. The workshop, which was held in New York City at 
a facility donated by the New York Public Service Commission, involved an audience of 
approximately 120 persons from a range of stakeholder groups, including state governments, 
electricity generators, electricity consumer advocates, environmental groups, and other interested 
parties. The workshop agenda included: (1) an overview of auction theory, 2) a panel on 
concerns of stakeholders about using an allowance auction in RGGI, 3) a panel on the 
motivations for and important design elements in existing auctions in other contexts, and 4) a 
panel on past experiences with auctions of emissions allowances. Background materials, 
including slides, are available at the RGGI website (see: http://www.rggi.org/documents.htm) 
and at RFF’s website (see: http://www.weathervane.rff.org/). 
Setting the Stage 
Franz Litz opened the workshop by updating the audience on the status of the proposed 
model rule and the revisions that were, at that time, in process in response to comments received. 
Subsequently, in August 2006, the model rule was released. Litz discussed the intention of the 
RGGI Staff Working Group to release a companion document that talks about important actions 
going forward, including efforts to deal with leakage and the establishment of a regional 
organization to run RGGI.  
Litz discussed how the public benefit allocation, officially referred to in the RGGI MOU 
as the consumer benefit and strategic energy allocation, fits into the RGGI program. Decisions 
about allocation largely have been left to the states with one exception, which is the agreement to 
devote 25 percent of the allowances to broadly defined public purposes. How that set-aside is 
administered and the exact use of the allocation is up to the states. Each state will have an 
account with these allowances in it; the question is how to allocate them. Possible approaches 
include direct allocation to consumers or to firms doing energy efficiency work or direct 
allocation to non-emitting generators, perhaps on a project-by-project basis. Alternatively, these 
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allowances could be converted to cash through an auction and the funds could be dispensed for 
various purposes.  
Litz stated that what the RGGI Staff Working Group hopes to learn several things from 
the workshop, as follows. If states were to choose an auction, how should it work? Should it be 
regional? Or should there be coordinated state auctions? Should the states pool their resources to 
set up an auction infrastructure that would be available to the states to use as they wish? Should 
the auction be open to everyone? Should there be a right of first refusal to emitting sources and 
should the auction restrict participation by others?  
Litz indicated that the timing of this workshop gives states time to further consider the 
issue of auctions and to learn more about it and to hear from stakeholders their ideas about how 
auctions should be structured. She noted that there is no need to spell out the rules for the auction 
or other means of distributing the public benefit set-aside in the model rule or in the rules that the 
individual states are writing. The rules can merely state what the public benefit set-aside will be 
in each state and who is responsible for administering the set-aside. The details of how an 
auction would work can be worked out after the rules are finalized.  
Overview of Auction Theory 
Charlie Holt from the University of Virginia presented general background on auctions, 
including an overview of theory. Auctions have a long history, dating to Roman times. In the 
United States, auctions of the airwave spectrum at the Federal Communication Commission 
(FCC) are one of the most well known. 
One type of auction is the English auction, where the price goes up. The auction of 
stamps was one of the first applications and the winner typically would pay the price at which 
the second-highest bidder dropped out, which is known as a second price auction. Proxy bidding 
emerged when a bidder would send a bid via messenger when he could not be there in person. 
The English auction is the type found on Ebay. 
Instead of having the prices go up, the prices could come down, as in a Dutch auction. 
Prices start high and come down and the winner is the first person to purchase an item at the 
current price. There is a strategic tradeoff in that a bidder must tradeoff the advantage of a lower 
price with the increased probability of losing the auction. The strategic situation is simpler in the 
English auction, because one can bid up to one’s willingness to pay, if necessary, and an English 
auction can help one discover one’s willingness to pay. In this sense auctions create value.  
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The well-known Vickrey auction (Vickrey 1961) involves a sealed-bid auction that 
implements a proxy approach, with the prize awarded to the high bidder at the second highest bid 
price. The appeal of the Vickrey auction is that it encourages bidders to reveal their true value. 
However, it can cause problems when there is a big difference between the winning bid and the 
second highest bid. In this case, the seller may not realize revenue that is close to the winner’s 
true willingness to pay because the second-highest willingness to pay determines price. This type 
of example creates anxiety about uniform price auctions. However, this is most relevant when 
there is an auction for a single item but is not such an issue when there is an auction for a number 
of homogeneous items, such as emissions allowances. 
Another solution to this concern would be the astute selection of a reserve price. This 
would protect against sale at an unacceptably low price but also tends to reduce participation. In 
one experiment (Reiley 2006), a reserve price lowered participation but raised the price received 
when a sale was achieved. It appears that bidders with high values above the reserve price raise 
their bid in anticipation that others also will bid higher. 
Another issue is a sealed bid (like a proxy bid) versus an ascending bid. In a sealed bid, 
there is the possibility of strategic uncertainty and regret. There is no chance to learn about one’s 
own preferences or the preferences of others, and evidence suggests that risk aversion can push 
bids up. Sometimes under sealed bids, the losing bids are not revealed to protect bidding agents 
from embarrassment and to encourage high-value bidders to take a risk and go higher. Sealed-bid 
auctions also can yield an inefficiency in which the high-value bidder does not win the item 
because this bidder does not have a chance to learn and revise his or her bid. One reason that the 
FCC has moved toward an ascending bid auction is to try to improve the efficiency of the 
allocation—the chance that the bidder with the highest value is the winner. 
Another distinction is private value versus common value auctions. If an item has known 
value characteristics that can be observed prior to purchase, then it has a private value, which can 
vary from one person to the next. Items purchased for personal consumption may fit into this 
category since there is no need to speculate about what the item may bring in resale. A common 
value auction, in contrast, refers to a situation in which all bidders have the same underlying 
common value; however, this common value cannot be observed perfectly, and estimates would 
typically vary from one bidder to another. If an item is for personal use, it has a private value. If 
something has resale value, it has an underlying common value. Often an item such as an oil 
lease has a common value but it is unknown. Even if estimates are unbiased, the person with the 
highest estimate is likely to make the highest bid and may pay too much. This gives rise to the 
winner’s curse. The person with the highest estimate may want to take into account the estimates 
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of other bidders, which are lower, and therefore may want to lower their own bid to hedge 
against the possibility that their estimate is too high. 
The FCC cell phone license experience offers a rich history. Initially, the broadcast 
spectrum was allocated by an administrative proceeding labeled “beauty contests.” In the face of 
opposition to market allocations, the FCC request in the 1980s to use auctions was denied and 
the FCC conducted a lottery instead. In one such lottery, they received 320,000 applications for 
643 licenses. Accounting firms prepared applications at a cost of $600 each. Total application 
costs were estimated to be $400,000. The post-auction value based on resale was $1 million, so 
about 40 percent of the value was used up in the application process. Administrative proceedings 
and lotteries are examples of the ways that government measures can have unintended side 
effects. A virtue of auctions is that they generally bypass rent seeking and value destruction of 
this nature. 
Since the early 1990s, the FCC has used a type of English auction with prices that go up. 
One of the clever innovations is to auction all the allowances at the same time in a simultaneous, 
multi-round auction. The licenses pertain to geographic regions or frequency bands, so these are 
heterogeneous items. There are bidder activity limits, with a “use it or lose it” characteristic. 
Bidders bid up their activity limits or lose the activity, with activity being transferable across 
licenses. In other words, a bidder cannot withdraw from the auction and then re-enter. This 
forces people to bid seriously. There is a simultaneous close when no new bids come in for any 
license in any location. The FCC auctions generally are viewed as very successful in terms of 
revenue generation and efficiency; they have raised billions of dollars and other governments 
have copied them. 
But these auctions can fail when dominant bidders with high values are not challenged. 
So a good auction design creates a competitive situation. Often this is just a matter of simple 
good economics such as encouraging entry and preventing collusion. The U.K. spectrum auction 
anticipated this and earned $34 billion. In the subsequent Dutch auction, the number of licenses 
equaled the number of bidders and the government made a disappointing $3 billion. The key to 
remember in the emissions allowance auction is that as long as bidding alliances are not 
permitted, there will be enough bidders to avoid these kinds of problems. 
How should one go about auction design? Often one needs to do laboratory experiments 
to simulate the auction to see how things work. One thing experiments can do is convince 
policymakers of possible changes in behavior if they change the rules. In addition, running 
experiments is good for working out the details of the auction. 
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A typical policy experiment can use students or relevant professionals. They offer 
financial incentives and structure alternative environments and observe and compare outcomes, 
including revenue, economic efficiency, and political effects. They provide analysts with the 
confidence to make recommendations and they provide policymakers with a clear view of how 
the policy might work. “By contrast, mathematical equations have very little persuasive power” 
(Binmore and Klemperer 2002). 
One example of an experimental process that was used to simulate an auction was the 
2001 Georgia Irrigation Reduction Auction. Tobacco settlement money was set aside in an 
auction-like process to pay farmers not to irrigate. Experiments were run at Georgia State with 8 
to 80 subjects per group; alternative auction formats were explored. The process played a 
significant role in the final successful design of the auction. The experiments were inexpensive 
to run. 
Another important example was the 2004 Virginia NOx auction. Bill Shobe, who spoke 
about it later in the workshop, ran this auction. The auction was for 1,855 one-ton allowances for 
each of the years of 2004 and 2005, tradable in a 19-state area. The quantity in the auction 
represented 5 percent of the state total allocation. The revenue-raising auction was motivated by 
a budget crisis. The auction design was developed through experiments at George Mason 
University. The basic structure was a clock auction. The clock starts low and there are many 
bids. Over time, the price rises and people cut back on their bids. The solution is obtained when 
the amount demanded equals the amount supplied. A combinatorial clock would allow one to bid 
on blocks of allowances, say if one needed multiple types of allowances over different years or 
different geographic areas (in the case of the spectrum auction). Prices are not driven up as in the 
FCC auctions but are run up relentlessly by a clock.  
The NOx auction was inexpensive to run, costing about $200,000, and yielding $10.5 
million. It had prices that matched the over-the-counter prices well and was implemented very 
quickly. 
In conclusion, previous experience indicates that auctions have many virtues. Auctions 
can bypass wasteful rent seeking. Auctions create real economic value by finding the high-value 
users. Auctions promote price discovery by bringing together all buyers and releasing significant 
quantities. Auctions are fast, fair, and generate high revenue when properly designed. Emissions 
allowances are relatively homogeneous, so auctions should be simple to design. Charlie Holt 
suggested looking at clock auctions as a strong candidate for generating fast, efficient, and high-
revenue outcomes (i.e., maximum public benefit). The Virginia NOx auction is a good example. 
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Another alternative may be the design of the Irish auction for allowances in the EU emission 
trading program, which was discussed later in the day. 
Stakeholder Concerns 
The first group panel focused on stakeholders’ concerns about using an auction to 
distribute allowances in RGGI. The panel, which was moderated by Sandra Meier of the 
Environmental Energy Alliance of New York, included presentations by a former New York 
Independent System Operator (NYISO) market monitor, an electricity trader, and a utility 
regulator. While the panel members agreed on the importance of establishing the rules of the 
allowance market and allowance auctions—should the states choose to go that route—in a timely 
fashion, they offered different opinions on the timing of allowance auctions vis-à-vis capacity 
market offerings, the potential for allowance shortages, and the need to limit access of non-
generators to allowance auctions. 
The first speaker, Jim Savitt, an independent electric power industry consultant and 
former market monitor for the NYISO, spoke about issues of concern to generation and 
transmission owners and some environmental regulators. Roughly half of the power produced by 
independent power producers in New York State is sold under long-term power purchase 
agreements, and new independent power plant developers use these agreements to show 
financiers that revenues will be there in the future. Many existing power purchase agreements 
don’t allow for the pass through of allowance costs when RGGI begins and this is a concern. 
Also, power developers are concerned that the uncertainty about the future availability of RGGI 
CO2 allowances and their cost will lead to shorter term power purchase agreements in the future, 
which will make new generation projects more risky and increase costs of electricity in the 
region. Clarifying the rules of the auction may help to reduce this risk.  
Savitt also indicated that the CO2 allowance auction will affect the cost and amount of 
installed capacity made available in installed capacity (ICAP) markets, such as the one operated 
by NYISO. Participation in the ICAP market carries with it the obligation to offer to supply 
energy into the day-ahead market every day. Uncertainty about getting allowances will increase 
the ICAP offer price and the risk of participating in the ICAP market. Certain units in New York 
City must participate in the ICAP market, so it will be very important to them to have some 
certainty about their ability to procure allowances. 
Savitt also talked about the limits of the simulation models that have been used to analyze 
the effects of allowance allocation. These limitations include inability to represent fully 
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reliability constraints that cause units to operate more or less often than efficient levels and to 
consume allowances at different rates than represented in the model outcomes. Models also fail 
to represent pricing of generators that operate for local reliability reasons, which generally are 
under specific price caps and therefore are not allowed to recover their operating costs directly 
through market prices. 
Savitt recommended that the public benefits allocation be capped at 25 percent and that 
generators should have the right of first access (or first refusal) the first two-thirds of those 
allowances sold at auction. He recommended that the allowance auctions precede the ICAP 
auctions in time so utilities would have some certainty about the allowances they hold before 
having to bid into the ICAP market.  
Dan Santelli of the AES Energy Market Group gave the perspective of an energy 
marketer on the use of allowance auctions in RGGI. His remarks focused on the frequency of 
auctions and the desire for clear rules going forward and consistency in rules across states. 
Energy marketers are interested in the development of a liquid market for allowances. He 
reiterated concerns about the impact of the RGGI program on generation facilities currently 
selling power under long-term contracts and on the ability of new entrants to sign the requisite 
10–15–year power purchase agreements that financiers are looking for. Santelli described the 
virtues of small-volume auctions as likely high participation, little impact on over-the-counter 
markets, and accurate price signals. Such auctions also would help power developers in their 
planning. He cautioned that large-volume auctions could result in low participation due to high 
requirements for cash. Large volume auctions also could disrupt the secondary over-the-counter 
markets for allowances.  
Mark Reeder of the New York Public Service Commission gave his personal 
perspectives on the allowance auction in RGGI. Mark encouraged RGGI designers to decide on 
key program parameters, including how new entrants would be allocated allowances, soon to 
help reduce uncertainty for power suppliers. Another way to limit uncertainty for generators 
would be to announce that there is no risk that some portion of the public benefit allocation will 
be retired in the future in the name of greater reductions in greenhouse gases. Such a policy 
would limit the states’ ability to exercise monopsony power in the allowance market through 
special treatment of the public benefit allowances. 
Reeder argued that RGGI stakeholders should think about allowance costs in the same 
way they think about fuel costs. He doesn’t think availability of allowances will be an issue. The 
market can create more allowances for sale overnight by changing the dispatch to increase output 
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of gas and decrease output of coal. Such behavior would be induced by an increase in the price 
of allowances. He argued that the allowance market probably is even more flexible than fuel 
markets, where issues of deliverability on pipelines and rail can cause short-term problems and 
price spikes. There will be no short-term reliability problems attributable to shortages of 
allowances given the three-year compliance period with the RGGI caps.  
Contrary to Savitt, Reeder argued that generators don’t have to have allowances in 
advance to participate in the ICAP market. Participation in ICAP obligates firms to offer into the 
day-ahead energy market but doesn’t restrict the level of price that they bid. So firms are free to 
bid up to the energy price cap if allowance costs are high, just as they would if fuel costs were 
high. Reeder argued that giving generators the right of first refusal to allowances in the auction 
shouldn’t be necessary. There will be a secondary market, and if allowance prices go up, 
dispatch will change to make more allowances available. He also suggested that of all potential 
participants in the allowance market, generators are likely to have the strongest incentive to drive 
up allowance prices in order to drive up power prices. Such activity could have a particularly 
positive effect on the profits of non-emitters, such as nuclear plants. Granting generators the right 
of first refusal in an allowance auction may not be the best idea when trying to guard against the 
exercise of market power in energy markets.  
Reeder said that auctioning several years worth of allowances up front will lead to low 
allowance prices and is probably not a good idea. This is a lesson that has been learned in 
forward markets for large chunks of transmission capacity. A small amount of forward sales 
might be acceptable but should be limited. Reeder argued in favor of allowing over-the-counter 
trading to precede the auction in time to inform the first auction in terms of price discovery. 
The post-panel discussion expanded on a number of issues raised during the panel. A 
workshop participant asked about the potential inconsistency between Savitt’s call for a clear 
understanding of how new sources would procure allowances and his recommendation that 
existing generators have a right of first refusal for two-thirds of the auctioned allowances. The 
questioner pointed out that in an open auction, both new and existing sources would have an 
equal chance to obtain allowances. Savitt replied that generators who are parties to existing long-
term power purchase agreements need to be able to get allowances to cover their obligations. 
Savitt’s recommendation that the public benefits pool be limited to 25 percent was challenged by 
a member of the audience who pointed out that even for allowances that they receive for free, 
firms selling in the day-ahead market would be able to pass along these opportunity costs in 
electricity prices. Also, limiting the public benefits pool in this way would limit state access to 
funds that could be used to fund programs that reduce demand for electricity. Savitt agreed that 
9 Resources for the Future  Burtraw and Palmer 
generators would pass on the allowance costs in electricity bids and prices and that electricity 
prices should be set to reflect marginal cost, including allowance costs, at all times to encourage 
conservation when it is most valuable to society.  
A couple of the questions for the panel were on the relative desirability of multiple, small 
auctions versus a single large auction. Santelli, who advocated for multiple small auctions, said 
that more frequent small auctions would be easier from a cash flow perspective and in terms of 
forecasting operations and need for allowances. Small auctions would also limit the firms’ 
exposure to CO2 price risk. They also would be less apt to disrupt the existing over-the-counter 
market. Reeder said that if firms are selling energy on the spot market, they might want more 
frequent opportunities to purchase allowances, much they way they purchase fuel. If they sell 
more power in the long-term contract market, then they can purchase allowances in larger 
chunks to match their revenue stream. A participant pointed out that NOx allowances are only 
allocated for three years at a time and so those with longer term power purchase agreements must 
either purchase financial forwards or take on the allowance price risk in the future. A participant 
asked Santelli if there was less future risk when someone knew that in the future, allowances 
would be auctioned versus another system with no auction. Santelli’s answer focused on the 
potential for price risk that was not eliminated by knowing there would be an auction, as you still 
didn’t know what the market-clearing price would be in that auction. His concerns were largely 
focused on uncertainties about cost of CO2 controls and the uncertainties about how well the 
RGGI CO2 allowance market will work. Savitt was asked about how his experience with the NOx 
market informed his concerns about reliability effects of the CO2 market, and he recounted how 
difficult it was for some units to cover their NOx emissions with allowances during peak demand 
periods in the summer of 2005.  
Motivating Factors and Design Principles in Existing Auctions 
The second panel, chaired by Chris Sherry of the New Jersey Department of 
Environmental Protection and the RGGI Staff Working Group, focused on experience with 
existing auctions in the energy and telecommunications areas. Sherry began the panel by listing 
the questions that the RGGI Staff Working Group hoped would be informed by the workshop, as 
follows. What types of auction mechanisms might best support regional coordination? What 
types of design elements would maximize price discovery and facilitate risk management? What 
are the relative administrative costs (up-front and on-going) of different approaches? How should 
auctions be timed to minimize market volatility? Who should be eligible to participate? Is the 
possible exercise of market power a concern, and if so, how might it be addressed? What is the 
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appropriate role for stakeholder participation in the design of an auction and in monitoring its 
implementation? What elements would facilitate stakeholder participation?  
Steve Gabel, of Gabel Associates, discussed the auction to procure basic generation 
service (BGS) in New Jersey. Gabel’s presentation began with a description of BGS. As a result 
of utility divestiture of generation assets in the late 1990s and early 2000s and very limited 
shopping by residential and small commercial electricity customers, New Jersey distribution 
utilities need to obtain power in the market to meet their obligations to provide BGS to 
customers who are not shopping for power. In 2001, the New Jersey utilities proposed that the 
best way to get BGS power at the lowest possible price would be to use a clock auction, and the 
New Jersey Board of Public Utilities (BPU) agreed. Between 2002 and 2006, five auctions to 
procure BGS power were held in February of each year (auctions such as this also have been 
approved in Illinois). Auctions have led to stable retail prices for electricity in New Jersey over 
this time period: between 2003 and 2005, natural gas prices rose by 41 percent but electricity 
retail prices rose only by 2.7 percent. 
The New Jersey BGS auction is overseen by the New Jersey BPU, which annually 
sponsors a proceeding to gather input from stakeholders and makes adjustments to the auction 
program if necessary. The BPU reviews each utility’s bidder qualification criteria, auction rules, 
and Master Supply Agreement, all of which are subject to comment by interested parties prior to 
BPU approval. 
Each year since 2004, the New Jersey utilities have put out to bid three-year contracts 
that total up to about one-third of anticipated load over the three-year time horizon. The 
staggering of contracts in this way helps to smooth out price volatility through averaging. Total 
load put up for bid is load following generation service and is requested in blocks of 100 MW. 
The auction is conducted by an independent auction manager and is run over the Internet. The 
BPU also hires an auction expert to advise them on the implementation of the auction, to oversee 
the operation of the auction in person, and to provide a report to the BPU after the auction on 
whether the auction was competitive and conducted in a manner consistent with the rules.  
Prior to the BGS auction, detailed data on the nature of load and load shape are provided 
to potential bidders. At least 10 days before the auction, the auction manager will announce 
utility-specific load caps and statewide load caps limiting the amount that any single supplier can 
provide to approximately 30 percent of total load. The manager also will announce minimum and 
maximum starting prices in the first round of the auction. Potential participants in the auction 
must first be qualified by establishing creditworthiness and agreeing to the terms of the BGS 
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Supplier Master Agreement. After this initial qualification stage, participants must attest that 
they are independent bidders and submit a financial guarantee document to cover their likely 
participation in the auction (how many blocks they would be willing to serve at the minimum 
bid, also known as an “indicative offer”).  
The auction works by setting a start price and then seeing who offers into the auction. In 
successive rounds, the price is reduced until the number of blocks bid on the supply side just 
equals the load needed to be procured. The bidders who hold the final bids when the auction 
closes are the winners. All winners receive the same price (for each utility). After the auction 
results are approved by the BPU, each winning supplier has three days to execute the Master 
Supply Agreement with the utility or lose its financial guarantee. 
Overall, the auction has been successful. The total value of each auction has been in the 
$4 to $5 billion range. Participation in the auction has been attractive to all participants and has 
led to stable prices for electricity consumers in New Jersey. 
Evan Kwerel of the FCC Office of Strategic Planning and Policy Analysis spoke about 
the FCC’s experience with spectrum auctions. He began his presentation with three take-away 
points that he wanted the audience to remember: 
•  Auctions have been a very successful mechanism for allocating spectrum. 
•  Collaboration among academics, industry, and the government was essential to 
the success of the FCC auction program. 
•  Be very careful of non-market allocations like preferential allocations and set- 
asides as most of the problems with the FCC auctions stemmed from these 
features of the program. 
The FCC has handled the allocation of rights or licenses to use spectrum that multiple 
parties want in different ways. Administrative approaches where used prior to 1982. Between 
1982 and 1993, the FCC used lotteries to allocate spectrum. Beginning in 1993, they started 
using auctions. The auction process was initiated at the FCC in near record time. In August of 
1993, the passage of the Omnibus Budget Reconciliation Act of 1993 gave the FCC authority to 
auction spectrum licenses. In March of 1994, less than 8 months after being granted legislative 
authority, the FCC adopted its general auction rules. The FCC conducted the first spectrum 
auction in July 1994. This happened quickly in part because there was little bureaucracy in place 
to deal with the decisions that needed to be made. Between July 1994 and early July 2006, the 
FCC completed 63 auctions, qualified over 3,500 bidders to participate in these auctions, and 
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auctioned more than 56,000 licenses. These auctions transferred over $14.5 billion to the U.S. 
Treasury.  
The motivation for moving to auctions came less from a desire to efficiently allocate 
spectrum and more from the record high federal deficits in 1993 and the requirement in the 
Budget Enforcement Act of 1990 that all increased government expenditures need to be paid for 
out of expected government revenue. In addition to these budgetary motivations, defects of the 
lottery approach to allocating spectrum became more apparent with the huge windfalls to those 
who won the spectrum lotteries. 
The design principles for spectrum auctions laid out in Kwerel’s presentation are to 
assign spectrum licenses efficiently; to raise significant revenue; to assign licenses quickly; to be 
simple and inexpensive for the government to run and for participants; to be robust against 
collusion and other types of strategic behavior; and to be perceived as fair, transparent, and 
objective. 
The FCC spectrum auction is a simultaneous, multiple-round ascending auction that is 
tailored to the specific needs of spectrum markets, particularly that of pairing different cities. 
This particular auction design probably is not the best for allowances, where a clock auction 
might make more sense because all allowances are of equal value. In any specific design there 
are tradeoffs. For example, greater transparency of the auction can make it easier for participants 
to collude, and, thus, some transparency may need to be sacrificed to make the design more 
robust against collusion. The rules of the FCC auction have been continually refined since the 
auction was introduced.  
Toward the conclusion of his talk, Kwerel described the key factors that helped lead to 
the success of the spectrum auction. These included the assistance of industry people and 
academics in coming up with and refining the auction design. Many of these academics were 
hired as consultants by bidders to help design different auction proposals that were considered by 
the FCC during the design phase. Thus, it was important for the FCC to have staff who were 
capable of evaluating the different arguments presented to them and engaging key players in 
dialog about the merits of different approaches. The auction experiments sponsored by the 
National Telecommunications and Information Administration and the FCC helped 
tremendously to sort out the different proposals. In addition, the FCC chair at the time was 
willing to ask questions and take risks that paid off in the end, and the auction started on a small 
scale, with only 10 licenses. The FCC also hired their own independent consultants, including 
game theorists and experimental economists, to help sort through all the options. 
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Kwerel offered some advice for the design of allowance auctions based on the FCC 
experience. He suggested that trying to start with a good auction design is important because the 
basic structure is unlikely to change substantially due to bureaucratic inertia and resistance to 
change. However, it is important not to get hung up on trying to have a perfect design from the 
start, as there will be opportunities to make improvements at the margin over time. Trying to get 
everything right initially could lead to paralysis. In the case of spectrum auctions, starting small 
and then ramping up the size of the auction over time helped to build experience and show that 
the auction worked, particularly with the fairly complicated structure of the spectrum auctions. 
He also recommended contracting out parts of the implementation, such as software 
development. For the FCC, hiring people to develop the auction software made possible greater 
use of technology in the auction than would have been possible if the auction were run in-house. 
Lastly, he cautioned against using non-market approaches to allocating allowances. In the FCC 
auction, almost all of the problems stemmed from the use of set-asides of allowances to 
designated entities, such as small business, businesses owned by women and minorities, and 
small rural telephone companies, who typically would not qualify to participate in the auction 
due to limited financial assets. These set-asides were accompanied by installment payment 
programs to help ease payment burdens and in the end there were lots of defaults on these 
payment plans, which have led to years of litigation. 
During the discussion, Steve Gabel was asked how volatility in fuel prices throughout the 
year was handled in the BGS auction. Gabel pointed out that the generators bear all the fuel price 
risk, as they bid in a fixed price for three years in the BGS auction for residential, commercial, 
and small industrial customer service. For large industrial customers, the fuel price risk is passed 
through to these large consumers and the auction is for a fixed capacity charge. In response to a 
question about who was eligible to participate in the spectrum auctions, Kwerel pointed out that 
anyone, including an individual investor, who is eligible to hold a spectrum license could 
participate. The FCC has used restrictions on participation in auctions in some cases to facilitate 
competition, such as limiting the maximum amount of spectrum that one party could hold in one 
geographic area (so that party could not monopolize the cellular phone market in that area, for 
example). The FCC has build-out requirements associated with licenses that require auction 
winners to use the license to offer service, although Kwerel does not think these are necessary 
given the high opportunity cost of not using the license. When asked about the wisdom of giving 
allowances away for free, Kwerel suggested that this activity is ripe for rent seeking, politics, and 
potential market distortions that use a lot of resources. Auctioning 100 percent of the allowances 
would avoid these costs. Kwerel said that when the FCC went to an auction system for allocating 
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spectrum licenses, they switched 100 percent to auctions and stopped doing lotteries for 
allocation of allowances. However, he recognized that a 100 percent auction might be unlikely in 
the RGGI case, so he urged caution when using other non-market approaches to allocate 
allowances. 
Experience with Allowance Auctions 
In the third panel, speakers presented their experience with three existing auctions for 
emissions allowances. Ken Macken from Ireland’s Environmental Protection Agency began the 
session with a description of the Irish allowance auction that was part of the European Union 
Emission Trading System (ETS) for CO2. Ireland was the first member state to implement an 
auction under the ETS. The emissions-trading directive was passed in July 2003 and is an 
attempt to preempt the five-year trading period under the Kyoto Protocol by initiating a pilot 
trading period. Since the pilot phase was to begin in January 2005, the timeframe was very short 
for planning all features of the trading program. The framework required a registry system and 
an allocation system based on national allocation plans. The legislation in the EU required that 
each member state make available free of charge at least 95 percent of their allowances in the 
first phase; in the second stage, this amount is reduced to 90 percent. The member states have the 
option of auctioning the remainder. Ireland decided to auction 1 percent of its allocation.  
Ireland did not have to design a system from scratch. There were available studies by the 
United Kingdom and the EU Commission. There were already elements of external consultation 
available. In addition, the Ireland Environmental Protection Agency cooperated with the 
National Treasury Management Agency, which looks after bond issues and other instruments in 
Ireland using types of auctions. This agency provided insights into the legal and logistical 
aspects of the auction, and they reviewed the process during various stages in developing the 
auction, as well as providing taxation advice. For example, a value added tax applies in Ireland 
on the value of goods sold, and the Environmental Protection Agency needed to know whether 
this tax needed to be applied to the auctioned allowances. The tax did not apply, which was 
information that was important for bidders to know. 
Developing the Irish auction was a process involving many persons. Conflicting advice 
was offered and decisions had to be made at several points in the process. The Irish experience 
benefited from establishing design principles for the auction, because it became easier to make 
subsequent decisions with these principles established. For example, one principle was to raise 
revenue to fund the enforcement of the trading system in Ireland. Second, it needed to be legally 
robust. Third, it needed to minimize administrative and participant costs, in part to facilitate 
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participation by smaller companies. Fourth, there was concern about strategic behavior and 
exercise of market power. Also, there was a desire to maximize participation. 
A key decision was to run the auction in two phases to lessen the risk of hitting a low 
point in the value of emissions allowances. The first auction was in February 2006, and the 
second auction will be held in late autumn 2006.  
There are many auction formats that could be used. Features of the EU ETS affected the 
choice of the auction format. There is a strong secondary market for allowances, and the Irish 
auction would be very small relative to the size of the market. There are about 11,000 
installations covered by the EU ETS, and there are about 8 billion allowances in the market. 
Ireland was to auction 500,000 allowances in total and 250,000 allowances in the first auction, 
which was a small amount. On the other hand, the amount traded in one day was relatively 
small—typically less than one million allowances—around the time of the first auction, although 
volumes have since increased. From this view, two possible methods seemed most appropriate. 
One is a single, sealed-bid auction and the other was an ascending clock auction. 
The ascending clock auction appeared to have theoretical advantages, but it was 
considered complex and a bit expensive because it would require software and probably would 
have to be run by an external consultant. The sealed-bid auction seemed simpler. For pricing, 
two options were considered: uniform pricing versus pay-as-bid pricing. The EU background 
paper recommended uniform pricing. Although it seemed at first that pay-as-bid pricing would 
lead to higher revenues, bidders actually tend to bid more cautiously in that type of auction. The 
uniform settlement price also helps avoid discovery of bids and the potential discovery that 
entities overpaid relative to other bidders, which may leave a “bad taste” for bidders in the 
auction. 
The chosen auction design included uniform settlement price and a nondisclosed reserve 
price that would only come into play if the bids were below that price. As it turned out, the price 
was not reached, and has not been disclosed, but it served as protection because they were selling 
a public asset. Also, “lot size” had to be considered. Smaller bidders would have problems with 
big lots, so the auction was organized with lot sizes of 500 allowances. There would be 500 lots 
in total.  
To be qualified, the bidder had to have a registered account on the EU registry because 
the allowances only have value in the electronic system. Parties with compliance responsibility 
are automatically given a trading account, but third parties also are authorized to open a trading 
account. Opening the auction to the broad market would likely ensure the broadest participation. 
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Restricting participation would increase the effect of strategic behavior. There was some concern 
that participation should be limited to Irish parties, but this did not make sense because a party 
could always use an agent to purchase allowances, and the allowances have value throughout 
Europe. To ensure the broadest possible participation and to open the auction to the brokerage 
houses, there were no restrictions placed on eligibility based on national identity. 
It was very important to conclude the auction by offering the allowances to a valid bid. 
Therefore, to ensure that the bid is valid, the auction involved a prequalification process, which 
simplified the operation of the auction, and a deposit of 3,000 Euros was required to discourage 
bogus bidding. The deposit would be refunded if the bid were unsuccessful. In addition, 
prequalification codes were required for participants. Codes could be requested up to two days 
before the bid and required a valid EU Emission Trading Registry account number and also two 
valid associated email addresses for the primary and secondary account representatives. 
Although there could be only one bid for each prequalification code, it could consist of 
up to five mutually exclusive bids on each auction form, knowing that more than one could be 
accepted. Each sub-bid included quantity and willingness to pay information. This was explained 
in a guidance note and the forms were available in Excel format, with various cross checks on 
accounting. Only one person failed to understand the forms properly. 
More than 150 bids were received and there were five successful bidders, resulting in a 
uniform settlement price of 26.30 Euros. Trading price on the market was around 27 Euros, so 
the auction came in just under the secondary market. Five days were allowed for settlements to 
be cleared, and all were. The overall auction had a very low overhead. 
Among the lessons learned: the prequalification codes were straightforward and worked 
very well. What didn’t work very well were the deposits in the electronic banking system 
because of unanticipated security measures in the banking system, which restricted display to 
large financial houses. By the time this was discovered, the auction procedure had already begun, 
so a manual translation of numbers and codes was required. On the other hand, the electronic 
transfer of funds across Europe worked very well. Two days were more than sufficient to allow 
money to be transferred. The auction allowed five days for settlement but that is dangerously 
long because it allows time for over-the-counter prices to fluctuate and for bidders to try to 
withdraw their bid or not settle the transaction. Also, the auction vulnerability was not handled 
properly. A deposit of 3,000 Euros would have been insufficient if there had been great volatility 
in the market price, with possible widespread defaulting. This feature will be revisited for the 
next auction. 
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The second example of a previous auction was presented by Joe Kruger, currently at the 
National Commission on Energy Policy and previously with the U.S. Environmental Protection 
Agency (EPA), where he worked on the implementation of the sulfur dioxide (SO2) trading 
program. The 1990 Clean Air Act Amendments that set up the SO2 trading program had a small 
auction of about 2.8 percent of the annual allocation. The auction proceeds are returned to 
emissions sources; it is not a revenue-raising auction. Each firm receiving allowances allocated 
to their sources had to donate a percentage to the auction, but they received back the revenue 
from those allowance sales. The first auction was held in 1993, and annual auctions have been 
held since. There is an active secondary market, so the auction does not play a big role. 
The purpose of the auction was to guard against early fears of allowance hoarding, given 
limited experience at the time with allowance markets. These concerns were heard especially 
from independent power producers who did not receive an allocation under the program. Another 
reason was to help develop a market by providing information about the value of allowances.  
Congress decided most of the decisions about the structure of the auction. The auction is 
a sealed-bid, pay-as-bid, or price-discriminating auction. Participation is not restricted. In the 
early days there was concern about credibility for the auction. Although the EPA could have 
decided to run the auction itself, it tried to enlist the Treasury Department, which has expertise in 
treasury auctions. Ultimately, the EPA turned to the private sector and put out a no-cost request 
for proposals and received three bids; the Chicago Board of Trade was chosen. In 2006, the EPA 
took over the auction. 
The auction turned out to be a useful instrument for revealing the value of allowances. 
The clearing price at the first auction was $131, which was roughly half of the allowance price in 
the market at the time. There was concern that the auction design may have been responsible for 
depressing prices, and this may have occurred. However, it is clear that the huge discrepancy was 
not due to auction design but instead to the difference between expectations and the realized 
underlying marginal cost of compliance in the market. Over the next year, the auction price and 
allowance prices in the secondary market converged and they now track each other closely. Over 
the years, power companies have bought about two-thirds of the auctioned allowances and power 
traders and brokers and miscellaneous organizations have bought one-third, including a very 
small number bought by nongovernmental organizations, such as law school classes. One other 
provision of the auction is that companies can submit their allowances for bid and the EPA 
would include these allowances in the auction, but this provision has rarely been used.  
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Some lessons learned begin with the key proposition that the purpose of the auction 
should guide the auction design. Auctions were important in the early years for price discovery, 
but they have become less important. Fears about market power and hoarding were unfounded. 
The key administrative issue is credibility; speed, efficiency, accuracy, and transparency 
contribute to this. 
The third speaker was Bill Shobe, who discussed the Virginia NOx auction. Shobe is 
currently Director of Business and Economics Research at the Weldon Cooper Center for Public 
Service at the University of Virginia. He previously was the chief policy economist in the 
executive branch in Virginia, where the auction was put together. The context for development 
of the auction was a severe budget shortfall in the state in 2002. An original proposal to auction 
all 20,172 of the annual, one-ton NOx allowances met with mixed reviews within the 
administration. Ultimately, it was uncertainty about how the U.S. EPA would view the auction 
that led the state to decide not to auction all the allowances. However, a legislative staff person 
inserted surprise language for an auction of the approximately 5 percent of NOx allowances that 
were to be set aside for new sources. This led to the very first revenue-raising auction for 
tradable allowances. 
The criteria for design of the auction were to maximize revenues (even though the total 
amount was relatively small), to be completed on a very short time schedule, and to be fair and 
understandable. Why do an auction instead of a direct sale? The concern was that the participants 
in the market on a given day would be idiosyncratic and so would the price that was obtained. 
Allowance prices are expected to follow a Markov process, meaning today’s price is the best 
predictor of tomorrow’s price, but the current price was not necessarily the best signal of future 
trends. There was concern that a direct sale would involve second-guessing the market in 
establishing a reserve price and a sale price. Economic theory and long experience suggest that it 
is difficult, under such conditions, to set up circumstances that give a public employee both the 
flexibility and motivation to maximize revenues. Finally, auctions are used a lot and are fairly 
well understood. 
Daily liquidity was a concern where 50–150 tons were sold in the NOx over-the-counter 
market. The state planned to sell 3,710 allowances, each enabling one ton of emissions. Some 
representatives of the major brokerage firms said that this sale would overwhelm the spot 
market, leading to a big price drop. This concern turned out to be misplaced. 
Detail of auction design is critical, according to the literature. Although there is lots of 
literature on various designs, the state felt the need to run experiments to verify the expected 
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performance of the design. Experimental economists at George Mason University explored three 
designs: a simple sealed-bid auction, a three-stage sealed-bid auction, and an English clock 
auction. The English clock auction outperformed the other approaches by 17 percent in the 
experiments. Given the time constraint, the state initially thought it would have to construct a 
sealed-bid auction. However, in the bids from brokerage firms for implementing the allowance 
auction, one firm proposed an English clock auction. This bid was selected, but the auction 
design details and software for implementing them in the online auction had to be developed 
very quickly. During the final design process, compromises had to be made between the 
concerns of the experimentalists and the concerns of the brokers. 
Financial assurance was guaranteed by requiring bidders to put into escrow with a third 
party as much money as they were willing to spend on their purchase. The software restricted 
purchase of more than this amount. To collect money from escrow, the state simply had to show 
the third party that the bidder had submitted a winning bid. The state set a reserve price to avoid 
collusion and to protect against the prospect that the relatively large sale would depress the over-
the-counter market. Bidders knew a reserve price existed but did not know its level.  
The bidding firms expressed a strong preference for having their bids kept secret, as they 
felt that the bidding would reveal important private information to outside parties. However, 
Virginia’s strict freedom of information laws did not allow this information to be kept private. It 
would be worth giving some attention to the question of whether the performance of an 
allowance auction could be improved by making it possible to keep bidding behavior private 
during the auction. 
In the clock auction, bidders see only their current price and whether or not the auction is 
still open. The bidders do not see the identities and bid quantities of others or the amount of 
excess supply at each stage as the auction progresses. The auction involved 19 bidders and 10 
winners for 2004 allowances and 15 bidders and 5 winners for the 2005 vintage. The auction did 
not interrupt the over-the-counter market, with winning bids well above the over-the-counter 
prices on the morning of that day.  
In conclusion, daily liquidity in the market is not a measure of overall liquidity in the 
market. Financial guarantee requirements were the greatest barrier to participation but were 
essential to success. The third-party escrow approach worked very well. Participants understood 
the auction; simplicity was important. The sequential auction with vintage 2004 allowances in 
the morning and 2005 allowances in the afternoon worked very well. 
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Wrap-Up 
Joe Kruger provided his perspectives on some of the take-away messages from the day. 
Charlie Holt’s presentation showed that there is a well-established body of research and literature 
on auctions for public policy. Panel presentations described applications of auctions in areas not 
related to emissions markets, such as electricity and spectrum, and also in emissions markets. 
The scope of what RGGI is doing is much grander than what has been done in the past with 
auctions in emissions markets. This issue is probably at the root of the concerns of some of the 
stakeholders about using an auction in RGGI. Some of the concerns that were voiced throughout 
the day are more general concerns about the allowance market in general and not just the use of 
auctions. These kinds of concerns have been associated with every new emissions market in its 
early phases.  
What should guide the design of an auction if RGGI states decide to go in this direction? 
Any design should try to raise revenue effectively. To the extent possible, decisions should be 
made that ensure liquidity. The market should be as transparent and rules should be as clear as 
possible for all participants. The auction market should not interfere with the over-the-counter 
market. Competition in the auction will help to ensure fairness and to guard against collusion. 
The questions offered by Chris Sherry at the beginning of the afternoon are a good starting point, 
and a next step should be to look at these questions with an eye toward the goals of the auction to 
see which designs best meet RGGI goals. 
Other important messages came out throughout the day as well. Consulting with experts 
is useful and important. Stakeholder involvement also will be useful and important in trying to 
come up with a design that works.  
Road Map 
The collective wisdom of the speakers at this conference provide some important insights 
regarding how best to proceed in designing a CO2 allowance auction in RGGI, should the states 
chose to use auctions to allocate the public benefit set-aside. The important next steps as they 
emerged in the discussions and from the lessons of previous programs are listed here. Many of 
these steps could proceed simultaneously, so the ordering is not necessarily sequential.  
•  Articulate the goals of the allowance auction. Several goals were identified by the 
speakers, including: raise revenue effectively to fund public purposes; keep costs 
low to government and to participants; promote a liquid allowance market; do not 
interfere with functioning of over-the-counter market; guard against collusion and 
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strategic behavior; and support regional coordination. A clear articulation of the 
important goals will help RGGI. 
•  Identify basic auction designs that are consistent with goals. As Joe Kruger 
pointed out in his wrap-up discussion, the auction design should be aligned with 
the auction goals. For example, given the homogeneity of the commodity being 
auctioned, a clock auction, perhaps like the one used in the Virginia NOx market 
described by Bill Shobe, has been suggested by many speakers as one design 
worthy of consideration due in part to its low cost of administration and speed of 
execution. The clock auction also is fairly easy to understand. Other auction 
designs are available and efforts to enumerate those possibilities and their features 
and align them with the goals are key. 
•  Identify a range of relevant auction parameters. Numerous elements of auction 
design that are somewhat separate or separable from the basic design were 
enumerated. These include the minimum size of the allowance bundle to be 
auctioned; the frequency of allowance auctions; eligibility requirements for 
participation; and combined auctions or separate state auctions.  
•  Solicit input from stakeholders and independent experts. Evan Kwerel 
emphasized the importance of collaboration between government, industry, and 
academics in designing the FCC spectrum auctions, which came together in 
record time. Others throughout the day articulated both the concerns of 
stakeholders and the opportunities for getting stakeholders involved in developing 
an auction design. There may be considerable value to having this step come 
fairly early in the design process so that important design elements are established 
before laboratory testing begins. Soliciting input from stakeholders could result in 
some clever proposals from hired experts, but the RGGI states will want input 
from independent experts as well. 
•  Develop a short list of potentially appropriate designs. This step is where all the 
information gathered from experts and stakeholders is synthesized and the range 
of potential approaches to the CO2 allowance auction is narrowed. One way to do 
this might be to develop a matrix of design elements (e.g., basic auction design, 
limits on participation, frequency of auction, minimum lot size of allowances, 
etc.) and identify a few different combinations to be explored further. 
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•  Test auction designs with laboratory experiments. Virtually all of the speakers 
recommended conducting laboratory experiments to help understand how the 
auctions work and how changes in various design elements affect the performance 
of the auction along different dimensions. Experiments will illustrate how 
changes in the auction rules might affect participant behavior. They also will help 
in developing ways to communicate clearly how the auction operates. The results 
of these experiments should help state policymakers to narrow in on the design 
parameters from the matrix that make the most sense. 
•  Develop proposed auction rules. All three speakers in the first panel focused on 
the need for having clear and transparent rules, both for the allowance-trading 
program in general and for the allowance auction, and for achieving clarity on 
these rules as soon as possible. Some stakeholders expressed the view that 
consistency in rules across the states also is important. Franz Litz suggested that 
there is time in the RGGI schedule to work out the issues related to the allowance 
auction and to get further input from stakeholders and experts on several of the 
questions that came up today. These two perspectives argue for keeping 
stakeholders informed about possible options throughout the process of designing 
the allowance auction. 
One final insight was the importance of taking care that non-market approaches to 
allocating allowances, such as set-asides and preferential allocation, be done with care and in a 
way that doesn’t adversely affect the efficiency of the secondary allowance market or the RGGI 
program. The broader goals of the RGGI program should help to inform decisions about non-
market allocation. In the end, the point of an allowance market is to achieve emissions reductions 
in a cost-effective way. The pool of emissions allowances represents a large source of value that 
is created when public policy defines a new property right associated with the constraint on CO2 
emissions. Policymakers should be deliberate in how this value is distributed. An auction can be 
an especially efficient way to distribute emissions allowances initially, which contributes to the 
smooth functioning of a trading program and which results in financial value that in turn can be 
allocated to various purposes.  
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